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A PLACE FOR COLLABORATION, BARGAINING AND POWER APPROACHES
Introduction
Conflicts are normal and natural consequences of human interaction in
organizational settings. They occur for several reasons: internal stress
coming from the person and overlapping into the workplace, incompatible ex-
pectations among workers and work groups, differences over task procedure,
yalues, orientations and desired outcomes, increasing interdependences and
workloads, and external pressures and crises.
For example, the author is well -acquainted with a large urban school
district in which serious conflicts occur between two Associate Superinten-
dents. One party to the dispute appears to be experiencing intrapersonal
stress as a result of a pending divorce and is often overly sensitive and
angry. Superintendent A desires his colleague to deliver special reports
to his division on a weekly basis, but Superintendent B claims that he can-
not comply due to a work overload. One of these Superintendents views all
problems rationally-technically from a data systems point of view. The other
ts incensed and continuously faults him for "not thinking humanistically
about the needs of the kids." Moreover, pressures from the courts for forced
bussing have put an enormous burden on the Superintendent in charge of plan-
ning and systems. He frequently arrives at 7:00 a.m. and leaves the office at
6:00 p.m. He works on the weekends. While he believes in long-range plan-
ing, he sees himself in a "reactive" mode. He resents his colleague's accu-
sations that he could beat the problem if he were better organized and more
"proactive."
This is an article for conflict managers who want to try a variety of
methods to manage their serious disputes which, like the one above, may have
multiple causes. A contingency approach to conflict management is suggested
to provide managers with a conceptual framework for knowing what to do when.
This article may be different from the other papers because it considers
the costs and feasibility of successful conflict management implementation.
A contingency approach also stresses realistic constraints and complexities
which are important for practical but workable conflict management methods.
The other contributions emphasize either the desirability of a particular
mode of dispute settlement or an optimal level of conflict.
Three Conflict Management Modes
This article will focus upon three major conflict management modes from
which one can draw to formulate a situatioral theory appropriate to important
problems and disputes disrupting an organization. These are: Collaboration,
Bargaining and Power-play. Walton has already outlined the differences between
collaboration and bargaining approaches. Table 1 presents a modification
of his ideas, with the addition of power-play, which serves to contrast the
three conflict management approaches.
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
Tabular schemes such as the one in the table inevitably fail to account for
overlaps. In reality, much of what is listed as collaboration also occurs in
bargaining, and power-play also overlaps with bargaining. The table does serve
to highlight basic differences, however.
None of these three conflict modes is appropriate for es/ery contingency;
neither is any one used without consequence. Following is a brief description
of each mode with its possible cost, benefits, and requirements:
COLLABORATION : Collaborative theory maintains that people should surface
their differences (get them out in the open) and then work on the problems until
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they have attained mutually satisfactory solutions. The approach assumes
that people will be motivated to expend the time and energy for such problem-
solving activity. It tries to exploit the possible mutual gains of the
parties in the dispute and views the conflict as a creative force pushing
them to achieve an improved state of affairs to which both sides are fully
committed. Information is openly and willingly exchanged. When the parties
stagnate because they are too close to the situation to perceive viable
alternatives or are too protective of their own positions, a third-party
consultant may be used to help clarify the problem, sharpen the issues, find
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commonalities and, in general, help them to discover a win-win position.
Essentially, collaborationists argue that theirs is the most preferred
strategy for the good of the enterprise because: (1) open and honest inter-
action promotes authentic interpersonal relations; (2) conflict is used
as a creative force for innovation and improvement; (3) this process en-
hances feedback and information flow, and (4) problem-solving disputes has
a way of improving the climate of the organization so that there is more
4
openness, trust, risktaking and good feelings of integrity.
However, in my consulting experience I have found that collaboration is
not always useful nor feasible. Collaboration seems best employed when a
combination of factors exist which assure the method some reasonable degree
of success. Four major conditions which help determine the practicality of
the collaborative mode follow.
First, a moderately high degree of required interdependence is important
to force parties to expend the time and energy necessary to work their dif-
ferences. Openly confronting the issues is hard work and not likely to occur
unless there is a long-term stake in developing and preserving the relation-
ship.
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Second, seeking collaborative solutions to conflicts involves more than
simply acting together in role to accomplish a task and reach an objective.
It also requires having a real and equal stake in the outcome and feeling
free enough to interact openly, including conflicting, in the collaborative
relationship. A kind of power parity must exist which allows the parties to
feel free to interact candidly and use all of their resources to further their
beliefs and concerns (regardless of their superior-subordinate status).
Third, there must be mutual self-interests in solving the specific dis-
pute. The person or group in conflict must experience a "felt" need that leads
him/it to want to work on the issue involved. This is related to the two
requisites cited above. But in addition to a compelling reason and feeling
enough parity to be able to collaborate, the parties themselves must perceive
some significant motivation concerning the issue at hand. Their motivation
often depends on whether the mutual gains are self-evident.
When there is required interdependence, power parity and a felt need pro-
voking the will to engage in the process, then the fourth factor comes into
play. It is the extent to which there is organizational support for such be-
havior. Considerable organizational resources are needed to effectively manage
conflict using the collaborative strategy. Such a program usually requires a
commitment of time, money and energy. For example, the organization (including
top executives) should engage in a collaborative mode system-wide, so that the
norms, rewards and punishments of the enterprise will encourage such behavior.
Most people are unaccustomed to open disagreement, especially with someone of
higher organizational rank, and need assurance that such behavior will not draw
reprisals.
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To confront one another effectively and emerge having resolved a problem
also requires an investment in personal skills. Learning how to communicate
effectively, how to synchronize the process, when and how to use a third party,
how to engage in effective problem-solving, and how to keep the tension level
moderate for optimal results requires skills that can be taught but may not
have already been learned. Indeed, many organizations would view such con-
structive openness as deviant. The enterprise should be sufficiently committed
to fund training for building skills to manage conflicts via collaboration.
Thus, it has become apparent to me that the implementation of collaboration
is often either infeasible (i.e. the right conditions do not exist for it to
work) or too costly to be justifiable. Accordingly, it becomes important to
re-examine other, alternative modes from the viewpoint of their benefits, costs
and feasibilities as they are related to the desired outcomes.
POWER-PLAY: Collaborationists often view power-play as diametrically
opposed to their own values and theory. Power-play, they say, will harm both
the indidivudal and the enterprise. It (1) unleashes aggressive behaviors
and hostile feelings between those involved in the power struggle, shutting off
communication and interaction; (2) promotes viscious gossip which in turn dis-
torts the valid information needed to successfully manage; (3) drives needed
information underground, as power-play is secretive and there is little oppor-
tunity for feedback and learning from experience; (4) subverts the corporate
mission through acts of sabotage and non-compliance; and (5) displaces goals
because much of the energy employed fighting the power struggle is diverted
from more productive causes; in fact, winning the struggle can become a more
5important end than achieving an organizational goal.
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Much of the fear of power-play is connected with what Rapoport called
the "cataclysmic" view of conflict -- that power struggles are necessarily
unmanageable, irrational and destructive. Although some escalated power
struggles fit this description, Rapoport reminds us that the use of power
strategies is often "strategic" -- characterized by both rational self-interest
and control
.
A number of considerations suggest that power-play is an appropriate
method of conflict management in many situations. First, there is a view of
individuals which says that they act first and formost in their own self-
interest and play an active power game to protect that interest. This view is
increasing in popularity, reflected in the increased frequency of books on
power in both the professional and popular literatures. Many people perceive
that they can win more by competing than they can by collaborating. Or, they
do not feel comfortable or skilled at problem solving while they may feel
particularly good, given their social experience, at power-play. Perhaps one
lias primary outside-the-organization interests and does not want to be highly
involved or committed to his work; hence, it is not in his interest to get
highly involved collaborating.
Individuals typically play one or a combination of three different power
games which strive for different types of power:
Authority is the power which is delegated by the organization to the
holder of a certain position. Formal authority, results in the ability to use
rewards, punishments, and other organizational resources in order to impact on




Informal influence is normally defined as being able to affect behavior
or gain compliance without holding a position of authority. Not everyone in
authority has influence. Some persons have little or no authority but much
influence. Some have influence far greater than that normally associated
with their official role. It is possible to become influential in the enter-
Q
prise without necessarily ascending the formal hierarchy.
Autonomy . Unlike the other power intents described above, autonomy
power derives from the need to be in control of oneself and to minimize un-
wanted influence by others. It is manifested in ones ability to resist formal
authority (control) and informal influence (normative demands) and to have
ample "space" to accomplish prescribed ends using unrestricted means. Highly
trained professionals, for example, seek autonomy, are little supervised and
are accountable for the quality of their end products (e.g. a surgical opera-
tion, a scholarly book, an architectural plan).
Individuals who strive for autonomy power may be yery interested in
building and protecting a piece of organizational territory. They become
indispensable in this domain. They are the experts, have the information and
hold unquestioned power. Autonomy-oriented persons may also have extra-
organizational interests (e.g. a civic or religious organization) or parallel-
organizational interests (e.g. a professional association) and wish to remain
"free" from organizational commitments and/or constraints in order to devote
more time to those activities.
Power-play, it is hypothesized, will be the dominant conflict management
strategy for those who seek autonomy. It has been pointed out elsewhere that
it is unpolitical in organizations to appear uncooperative and anti-system.
One must appear to act in the best interest of the enterprise. Those en-
deavors which are most self-interest oriented, in which the interests of the
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worker and the organization are least congruent, require the most covert
means. To be discovered as being aloof or free from the rules would cause a
^jery negative career-damaging impression. Autonomy is an unpopular intent
in most organizations because marginal ity is discouraged and total commit-
ment is rewarded. Power-play is a more secretive mode which could work in
the best interests of those whose covert objective is autonomy and whose
desired impression is that of being committed. Collaboration requires the
open sharing of personal intents, means for achieving them and the process
of finding a mutually satisfactory solution. Moreover, one is usually per-
ceived as committed to what he helps to decide regardless of how devious were
his real intentions.
Second, collaborating can be perceived as increasing vulnerability in
competetive external environments. There are significant aspects of conflict
of interest between those firms which transact business directly or compete
for resources, just as there are aspects of conflict of interest between
managers within a firm over promotion and resources. Collaboration, and even
bargaining, assumes the exchange of information necessary to resolve a problem.
This information may apprise competitor of weaknesses and give them an unfair
advantage. For example, disclosing strategic information (a key power-play
resource) might provide another organization with data for increasing its
efficiency, and therefore its competitive advantage.
Third, in some situations power-play strategies contribute to the joint
welfare of two contributing parties. Under conditions of routine and certainty,
for example, the self-interests of the individual and the enterprise may be
incompatible. To maximize its objectives, the enterprise increases its effi-
ciency via elaborate planning and control systems. The employees may likewise
improve their working conditions via inclusive union contracts. Power-play is
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the mechanism of flexibility used by both sides to cope within the confines
of tfie rules (which are never so tightly delineated as to disallow some man-
ipulation). Employees can use power-play to resist machine-like control;
employers can use power-play to cope with union contracts during periods of
uncertainty (e.g. rearranging work, laying off, calling for a common response
to a crisis). There exists a sort of dynamic equilibrium which works to the
pidyantage of both within the rules. It is the dynamic interaction of finding
matching self-interests which is the substance of power-play conflict manage-
ment. Such a mode allows multiple motives- and various methods to eventually
find a satisfactory equilibrium. Some activities are temporarily blocked as
the power struggles are waged. Yet, these are normally periods of re-align-
ment, reform and adjustment. In the long-term, they may be effective ways to
manage differences for the greatest number of persons and for the enterprise.
Fourth, power-play is often best suited to decide ideological disputes .
When values or philosophies clash, the parties are usually intransigent in
their conflicting positions. They refuse to problem solve or even negotiate.
The only recourse is for one to try to win at the expense of the other, al-
though both may emerge saving some face and being "right" for having taken
their stand.
BARGAINING: While neither party may emerge completely satisfied and one
party may be clearly dissatisfied under this mode, both will at least come to
terms openly about how to best resolve the most immediate issues. Bargaining
can be a more or less elaborate mode of conflict management depending on the
situation (from interpersonal trading to collective negotiation). The important
point is that, like collaboration, a common solution to a problem can be found.
The actual act of trading and compromising highlights the assumed strength and
influence of each party. In this process, the power position of each side is
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clearly defined in direct ratio to the information it reveals to the other, the
concessions it makes, the punishment or penalties it can impose.
Bargaining, while remaining unique, contains elements which overlap with
both, collaboration and power. It resembles the collaborative process because
it is a systematic method which, in some of its forms, allows for collaboration
between negotiators. Bargaining also contains many aspects of the strategic
win-lose power struggles more typical in power-play. Figure 1 illustrates
this point.
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE.
Bargaining, therefore, can be viewed as a "connecting bridge" between the
collaborative and power strategies of conflict management.
Bargaining employs some of the methods, values and motivational forces
used in each of the other modes. Bargaining is a middle-ground orientation
in which both power-players and collaborationists may feel somewhat comfortable.
There is little hope that they could deal effectively with one another each
using their own incongruent approaches. Bargaining neutralizes the values of
the conflict manager so that he does not impose one set of assumptions (e.g.
collaboration) on a very different situation (e.g. power-play). In the Organiza-
tion Development movement, for example, many instances of failure were reported
where collaborative values and methods of dispute settlement were superimposed
on power settings. It is proposed herein that bargaining would have better
matched the intervention situation.
Bargaining might also be viewed as an intervention bridge to either elevate
a power-play situation from a covert "lose-lose" condition to a situation in
which both parties have at least made an explicit — albeit "hard" or power-
based — agreement in their mutual interest. Or, using this bridge concept,
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it is a realistic alternative to fall back to when the conditions are not
present for collaboration. Figure 2 illustrates this last point.
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE.
Those who favor the collaborative approach would argue that bargaining
is of limited value because (1) it often creates new interpersonal -organiza-
tional conflicts by virtue of the win-lose strategies employed; (2) the
commitments to resolutions adopted are formal (based on having to prove that
an agreement has been violated rather than intrinsic and are, therefore, often
carried out only according to the letter of the law; and (3) no more than
one, perhaps neither, of the parties emerge fully satisfied.
On the other hand, bargaining seems to work well in many situations. It
is, for example, a good way to establish power parity so that more collabora-
tion can follow. Just getting into a trading position assumes some equality,
as each side recognizes that the other has something of value to offer
and/or withhold.
Scarce resources can often be bargained according to the strategies of
important interest groups, whereas they are not easily distributed using the
collaborative method. Tradeoffs where some win and some lose according to a
criterion of importance seem optimally suited to deal with conditions of scarcity,
Some persons or groups feel skillful at and comfortable with bargaining.
It fits their personal style. Moreover, bargaining is somewhat economical in
that parties meet only periodically to review the old contract and to recontract.
In summary, I have seen that many attempts to manage conflicts using more
overt (collaboration) or covert (power) means have worked when they matched the
situation. Bargaining is a "connecting bridge" mode which could serve in either
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situation. It is useful in power-play as a way to at least arrive at an
explicit and agreeable resolution. It is useful in collaboration as a more
realistic backup approach. It also has its own merit.
Conclusion
It is assumed that a wide variety of organizational conflicts will
occur quite naturally. Many of them will promote creative tensions which
lead to system improvement. Some will serve the interests of various parties
and groups without disrupting the organization itself. Others will be of
such import that they must be effectively managed.
This article attempts to make the point that there is no one-best-way
to manage organizational conflicts. The collaborative approach has been in
vogue during the past few years but has proven inadequate on numerous occa-
sions. This article has outlined three yery different modes, one of which
(power-play) is in sharp contrast with collaboration but optimal under some
conditions.
In considering the use of these three modes, it is vital to separate our
appreciation of organizational realities from the humanistic and sometimes
Utopian values which have impacted the field. Conflict modes must be tailored
to the actual motives, issues, and organizational circumstances of the con-
flict parties. Inappropriate application of collaboration or other modes by
a conflict manager, however well-intentioned, is apt to be ineffective at
best r- and destructive to one or both parties or to the organization at worst,
The following conclusions have been drawn:
Collaboration may be best employed when work relations would
be substantially damaged by a given unresolved conflict, when the
parties in conflict can openly confront their differences and state
their preferences without fear of reprisal (there exists power
parity in the relationship), when there is evident mutual interest
in solving the dispute, and when the organization supports the open
surfacing and working of disagreements.
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Bargaining seems to work best to establish power parity
(usually between competing people or groups), as a means of
distributing scarce resources, and as a somewhat economical
option for achieving a formal agreement to a common dispute.
Bargaining may also be the most effective way to manage a dis-
pute between two parties who each use one of the two
other modes (collaboration, power-play) and are, therefore,
unable to reach a common solution due to the disparity between
them. Bargaining is often a mid-way or "bridge" strategy.
Power-play , on the other hand, is an important way to
cope with conflicts for the autonomous; advantages those who
are most adept at this mode; is a means for achieving a dy-
namic balance of competing forces, and is often the best way
to resolve ideological disputes.
There is a need to know much more about power-play. One major problem
has been to find an appropriate method for studying it. Since infor-
mation is power and power is secretive, few will divulge their power game to
researchers. Also, being "political" or "selfish" is usually a negative
organizational image which requires covert rather than overt methods of power-
play so as to not be discovered and badly viewed. Very few empirical studies
document the dynamics of power-play. However, it is also s/ery probable that
the collaborative ethic in our field has discouraged research efforts on
the uses of power-play in organizations, despite the fact that it
appears to be the method most frequently used to resolve a number of kinds of
differences. It is clear that more accurate descriptive theories of conflict
management will require more extensive studies of the realities of power-play.
- 13 -
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